Abstract: Today, identity management systems are widely used in different types of organizations, from academic and government institutions to large enterprises. An important feature of identity management systems is the Single Sign-On functionality. Single Sign-On allows users to authenticate once, and freely use all services and resources available to them afterwards. In this paper, we present the usage of Kerberos in identity management systems. An overview of Kerberos protocol, state of the art of identity management systems and different generic architectures for identity management is given in the paper. Also, we present a Single Sign-On identity management architecture proposal based on Kerberos protocol, and discuss its properties. Special attention was given to authentication, authorization and auditing.
INTRODUCTION
In modern corporate environment, identity management systems are of an utter importance. Today, many companies have hundreds or thousands of employees. With the advent of distributed systems, each user has accounts for several diff erent applications, which are accessed remotely over the network [6] . Th ese applications vary from webmail to inventory management, and may use various authentication methods. As the number of applications and users rises, the risk of attacks such as identity theft or identity disclosure also increases. Th erefore, an appropriate set of policies, methods and rules must be applied [3] .
Most applications require separate authentication, and do not provide means for centralized management. For example, let us consider a following scenario. To use several applications, user has to memorize separate password for each of the applications. Th is situation has several consequences. As fi rst, the more passwords users have to memorize, the greater is the likelihood of using insecure passwords, which are easy for attackers to guess. Even strong password policies can be compromised by use of birthdays, personal id numbers or personal name derivatives. As second, the more passwords user has to memorize, the greater is the likelihood of forgetting some of them. For large enterprises, helpdesk expenses can raise to a signifi cant amount. Moreover, users waste their time because they need to separately authenticate to each application.
In order to solve this problem, an identity management system should be used. Identity management system is responsible for diff erent activities -identifi cation, authentication, authorization, user provisioning and auditing [7] . Identifi cation is the process of claiming user identity, while the process of verifying user identity is labeled as authentication. Some authors, like [13] , refer to identifi cation as a part of authentication process. User authentication methods can be divided in three categories -password based authentication, use of digital certifi cates or tokens and biometric based authen-tication. Password based authentication methods use something that user knows, tokens are based on something that user poses, while biometric authentication uses person's physiological or behavioral characteristic -something that user is. Authorization is the process of asserting user rights to access resources or services. User provisioning is correlated with authorization, as it manages user authorization privileges to be consistent with user role in the enterprise. Th e last, but not the least important activity is user auditing, the activity of tracking and logging system events.
Another advantage of using identity management system is the Single Sign-On (SSO) functionality. Single Sign-On allows users to authenticate only once, and freely use all services and resources available to them afterwards. In that way, users have to manage only one set of authentication credentials in order to access SSO-enabled services and resources [12] . Single Sign-On authentication has several benefi ts, such as increased security and usability. Problematical scenario described before in this section can be solved by the use of SSO.
A possible implementation of Single Sign-On functionality can be achieved by the use of Kerberos protocol. Th is paper will present a SSO architecture based on the Kerberos protocol. In the next section problem statement is given, and main reasons for the use of Single Sign-On are given. In section 3 a description of the Kerberos protocol is given. Section 4 describes state of the art of both of brand-name and open source identity management systems. Section 5 describes generic Single Sign-On architectures for identity management. In section 6, an architecture proposal is given. Th e last section summarizes our conclusions and gives recommendations for future work.
PROBLEM DEFINITION
In this paper the problem of Single Sign-On, primarily for corporate environment, is considered. Th ere are several reasons for using the Single SignOn functionality. Possible benefi ts gained by the use of Single Sign-On can be substantial.
As the number of applications per system user increases, it gets more diffi cult to manage authentication credentials. In the case of password based authentication, users have to memorize password they use for each application. Th is is a possible threat for system overall security, as some of the users may choose passwords that are easy to guess [4] . Another downside of this approach is the increased number of help desk calls because of forgotten passwords. It is estimated that an average help desk call costs about US$25 [10] .
Each time system user has to authenticate to a service, the login process consumes some time. Although this fact may seem of a minor signifi cance, if there is a large number of authentication requests, total time consumed may sum up to a signifi cant amount. Unsuccessful authentication attempts because of improperly entered credentials can additionally extend this waste of time and productivity. User experience also suff ers from a large number of required login attempts. If the authentication and authorization process is more convenient, then users will be more inclined to use available applications and services more frequently.
Single Sign-On is also tightly connected with user provisioning and authorization. Th e use of the SSO functionality allows easier maintenance of user accounts and privileges. However, when implementing Single Sign-On functionality, it is necessary to take special care of security of authentication credentials. If these credentials are compromised, potential imposter gains access to a wide range of system applications and services. Also, mutual authentication needs to be implemented [2] , in order to prevent spoofi ng attacks. In following sections of this paper, an SSO architecture proposal based on the Kerberos protocol will be presented. Th e main goal of the proposed architecture will be to address these issues.
KERBEROS PROTOCOL
Kerberos was developed at MIT under the Project Athena and became the most widely deployed system for authentication and authorization in modern computer networks. Th e fi rst three versions were used internally at MIT. Th e primary designers of Kerberos version 4 are Steve Miller and Cliff ord Neuman [11] . Th ey published that version in the late 1980. Version 5 was designed by John Kohl and Cliff ord Neuman in 1993 and fi nally MIT made an implementation of Kerberos freely available. Kerberos uses symmetrickey cryptography (system where both the client and the server share a common key that is used to encrypt and decrypt network communication) to authenticate users to network services [8] .
Kerberos authentication protocol off ers the possibility of reliable authentication over an open network. It provides a mechanism for authentication -and mutual authentication -between a client and a server, or between two diff erent servers. Kerberos protocol uses specially formatted data packets, which are known as tickets where they pass through the network instead of passwords. Kerberos messages are encrypted with encryption keys to ensure that no one can tamper with the client's ticket or with other data in a Kerberos message.
Kerberos authentication process is conducted like this: Th e client sends a request to the authentication server (AS) for "credentials" for the server. Th e result is a coded key for the client. Credentials consist of a "ticket" for the server and a temporary encryption key ("session key"). Th e client transmits the ticket to the server. Th e session key is used to authenticate the client and may optionally be used to authenticate the server.
If the client machine can decrypt the ticket encrypted in user password, then it is considered that the user is authenticated. If a target service is able to decrypt an encrypted ticket using its own secret key, the service may presume that the user who presented the ticket is authentic. Th e main benefi t of such protocol architecture is that no system or party in the Kerberos exchange has access to suffi cient information to impersonate any other system or party. Th ere is no password passing through the open network.
Authorization model is based on the principle that every service knows the user, so that each one can maintain its own authorization information. In fact, the Kerberos Authentication System can be expanded by information and algorithms that can be used for authorization.
Protocol implementation requires that one or more authentication servers run on physically secure hosts. Th e authentication servers maintain a database of principals and their secret keys. Code libraries provide encryption and implement the Kerberos protocol. Typical network application calls the Kerberos library directly or through the Generic Security Services Application Programming Interface. Figure 1 is a description of the Kerberos protocol, which looks like this: 1. Th e client must fi rst contact an authentication server (AS) to receive a ticket and an encryption key. 2. Client receives a ticket granting ticket (TGT) and an encryption key. Th e encryption key, called the session key, is used to unlock communication between the client and the server and thereby authenticate that communication. 3. Client requests a service ticket from the Kerberos server. Service ticket includes ticket-granting ticket obtained from the previous message and an authenticator generated by the client and encrypted with the session key. When the client wants to access a particular service, it sends the ticket to a ticketgranting server (TGS). 4. Th e TGS gives the client a ticket that securely identifi es the client to the requested service 5. Th e client presents the ticket to the network service it is trying to access and is granted access to the resource as many times as desired until the ticket expires. 6. Access is authorized and gives to the client prove it really is the server the client is expecting. Th is packet is not always requested. Th e client requests the server for it only when mutual authentication is necessary.
FIGURE 1 Kerberos protocol
Ticket-granting ticket (TGT) is the ticket for the full ticket-granting service. TGT presents credential in the form of an authenticator message and a ticket. It is a small amount of encrypted data that is issued by a server in the Kerberos authentication model to begin the authentication process.
IDENTITY MANAGEMENT -STATE OF THE ART
Identity management has grown up over the years. Critical issue around the world is how to achieve effective identity management. Most identity management systems are designed for a narrowly defi ned set of goals. Th ere are many diff erent vendors of proprietary identity management systems and open-source solutions, and their solutions off er various benefi ts. Today's available technology is good, but there is still room for improvements, in order to achieve better privacy protection and security.
Identity management solutions from Microsoft off er: Effi cient and secure delivery of e-services, seamless user experience across boundaries, simplifi ed management, application development effi ciency and Single Sign-On (SSO) experience across borders, platforms, and various authentication methods. Microsoft account enables users to log into many websites using one account.
Hewlett Packard provides a single, unifi ed technology platform which off ers the movement of biometric information from the device to the database, from the edge to the enterprise. HP's identity management solutions incorporate identity lifecycle management, federation services, directory management and access management, with reporting and auditing services. HP IceWall SSO is Web Single Sign-On software of Hewlett Packard Company. IBM's Identity management solutions allow operative management of the entire identity lifecycle: assessing, planning, implementing, auditing, monitoring and maintaining identities and access privileges. Among SSO solutions provided by IBM, the most relevant representative is the IBM Tivoli identity management [1] . It provides the ability to combine Single Sign-On, strong authentication and audit tracking without change of the existing infrastructure.
OpenIAM is an open source identity management solution. Th ere are two types of products: Identity Manager (Password Management, Provisioning, Audit and Compliance, Self-Service, Delegated Admin) and Access Manager (RBAC, XACML, Federation and SSO, Web Access Control, SOA Security).
Yale University created an authentication system which is called Central Authentication Service (CAS). Since 2004, CAS is a member of Java Architectures Special Interest Group. Formerly called "Yale CAS", CAS is now also known as "Jasig CAS". When a client wants to authenticate, the application redirects to the CAS, which confi rms the authenticity, and checks your username and password in the database (such as Kerberos). Another open-source project is FreeIPA by Red Hat which combines Linux (Fedora), 389 Directory Server, MIT Kerberos for authentication and Single Sign-On, NTP, DNS, Dogtag (Certifi cate System). It consists of a web interface and command-line administration tools. FreeIPA can be used for managing DNS domains, defi ning password policies and for integration with NIS domains and netgroups.
GENERIC IDENTITY MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURES FOR SINGLE SIGN-ON
Single Sign-on functionality largely depends on system architecture. For example federated identity management has some additional requirements, when compared to centralized identity management. In this section, the main elements of identity management systems are described by using block diagrams. However, before we can describe diff erent architectures, it is necessary to defi ne basic components present in every generic architecture.
System user is a consumer of services provided by the system. User must own at least one identity in order to use available services within a context defi ned by owned identity. To confi rm the claimed identity, system user communicates with identity provider. Identity provider is responsible for accepting or denying users identity, but it is also strongly tied with service provider. Th is way identity provider confi rms or propagates identity information to service provider. Depending on the information received from identity provider, service provider allows or rejects usage of requested services.
A traditional approach to identity management is the Centralized identity management system architecture [5] . In this case a centralized identity provider and all system services are provided by a single service provider. Th is architecture is shown in Figure 2 , and process steps are numbered. In Step 1, system user identifi es himself to identity provider. After a successful identifi cation of the system user, the system needs to authenticate the user. Identity provider is responsible for both identifi cation, and authentication. After completion of authentication, user receives a token from identity provider (Step 2), which is passed to the service provider in Step 3. Token is valid for a certain amount of time, and users do not need to authenticate each time they send request to the service provider. Th erefore, SSO requirements have been met.
Token is used by the service provider to verify user credentials and claims. Th is is done in Steps 4 and 5, where identity provider and service provider communicate in order to validate information carried by the token. After a successful validation, system user is eligible to use desired services (Step 6).
In this architecture, service provider is responsible for authentication. It is important to notice that all identity management architectures described in this paper follow previously described steps. In an alternative scenario, there is a centralized identity provider which represents a Single Sign-On point. Beneath it, on the lower level, there are numerous service specifi c identity providers. System user identifi es and authenticates with centralized identity provider, while authorization process is delegated to service specifi c identity provider. It is important to highlight that centralized identity provider does not care about authorization, nor its data. After initial sign on, user only needs to authorize with service specifi c identity provider in order to get access to a desired service.
Next identity management architecture exploits the fact that multiple identity providers could share information they have. By sharing the information and agreeing to work together, identity providers form a "federation", thus allowing system users to identify with any identity provider belonging to the federation. Because of that, this architecture is called Federated identity management architecture [14] . Th e main advantage of the Federated identity management architecture is that it enables system to work even if the service provider and identifi cation provider are not in the same organization. Th e Federated identity management architecture is shown in Figure 4 .
KERBER OS AUTHENTICATION -ARCHITECTURE PROPOSAL
Among described architectures, Kerberos is most suitable for the use in centralized SSO architectures FIGURE 2 -Centralized identity management system architecture with independent identity providers responsible for authentication. We propose the usage of Kerberos as identifi cation and authentication module, as there are several benefi ts from such choice.
As fi rst, system user authenticates with the Kerberos authentication server and receives ticket granting ticket and session key. When authenticating to service providers, system user requests service tickets from Kerberos ticket granting server. System user uses service tickets to authenticate with service providers. Independent identity providers are used for authorization. Diff erent solutions could be used for storing authorization data, for example an LDAP directory. For example, Free IPA uses 389 Directory service for this purpose. Various extensions of this architecture are possible, such as the use of Security Assertion Markup Language, an XML-based open standard data format for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties.
Architecture allows use of diff erent authentication methods. PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) can be used for initial, or cross realm authentication [15] . Use of PKI infrastructure allows easier administration of Kerberos key distribution center, revocation of certifi cates, and various other benefi ts. Kerberos provides mutual authentication, which makes phishing and man in the middle attacks diffi cult and not likely to succeed. Ticket system provides safe communication through open network, as system users do not have to send unencrypted passwords.
Kerberos off ers fl exibility with forwardable, renewable and proxiable tickets [9] . Identity theft risks can be lowered by the use of renewable tickets. At each renewal, Kerberos KDC can check if the ticket was compromised. Proxiable tickets allow services to do task on behalf of system users, while forwardable tickets allow complete use of client's identity.
Kerberos does not provide authorization functions or auditing functions. Th erefore, it is necessary to use other tools and applications for this task. In a workstation environment, one of the Kerberos weaknesses is a Spoofi ng Login where intruder very simple can replace the login command with a version that records users' passwords before employing them in the Kerberos dialog. Also, each network service with a diff erent hostname will need its own set of Kerberos keys. Th is complicates virtual hosting and clusters.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, various important aspects of the Single Sign-On functionality are revised. Special attention is given to the Kerberos protocol and its use in identity management systems. Several generic Single Sign-On architectures are presented, and an architecture proposal based on the Kerberos protocol is described.
Centralized Single Sign-On architecture based on the Kerberos protocol off ers various benefi ts. Secure mutual authentication, various authentication methods, real-world interoperability, possible integration with PKI are just some among many. Kerberos has been widely used by both academic and enterprise organizations for many diff erent tasks. Th erefore, Kerberos use is not limited only to centralized identity management. Federated SSO architecture could benefi t from the use of Kerberos as well. Cross realm authentication allows user of one Kerberos realm (administrative domain) to access services from other realms. Th is functionality is based on sharing keys, so it has some limitations, although these restrictions can be stretched by using transitive trust relationships. Another approach for federation is based on the use of PKI.
Primary objective of this paper was not a detailed analysis of Kerberos integration with other solutions for authorization and auditing. Such analysis should be done in future research. Future work could also include a comparison of Kerberos with possible authentication alternatives, such as Distributed Computing Environment (DCE). Moreover, challenges concerned with the use of biometric authentication in Kerberos are an important problem, and should be investigated. 
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